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Contemporary scholarship on the Olympic Games has turned to consider the negative long-term 
effects associated with hosting the Games, but has not looked at unsuccessful Olympic bids. 
Since bidding for the Games is expensive and time-consuming, cities will only bid if it can be 
shown to provide positive outcomes. This paper responds to the question “Did the unsuccessful 
Olympic Bids of Toronto 2008, New York City 2012 and Chicago 2016 act as policy windows for 
public policy or development projects?”  It finds that that Toronto’s and New York City’s bids did 
function as policy windows.  To bolster the likelihood of future Olympic Games bids functioning 
as policy windows, the paper proposes three recommendations:
1. The United States Olympic Committee and the Canadian Olympic Association should 
mandate that all future bid organizations will be public-private partnerships.
2. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) should amend the Olympic Charter to require 
cities to include a detailed legacy plan with as a part of an Olympic Bid.
3. The IOC should amend the Olympic Charter to require that comprehensive legacy plans are 
accompanied by the creation of a nonprofit legacy organization.
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 The Olympic Games, two weeks of sports and spectacle held every four years, are the 
metaphorical tip of the iceberg when the Games are examined from a planning and development 
perspective.  Host cities are selected seven years prior, and a larger group of cities participates 
in a bid process that can stretch back more than a decade before the Games actually occur. 
Scholarly and popular literature on the legacy of the Games for Host Cities is growing, but the 
effects on the unsuccessful bid cities – those not selected to host the Olympics – are largely 
unmentioned, disregarded, or misunderstood.  To bid for the Olympic Games, cities created 
development and infrastructure plans representing millions of dollars and years of work backed 
by substantial support from their citizenry.  Most Olympic scholarship ignores the unsuccessful 
bid cities in favor of the winning bids.  
 However, several trends in Olympic planning point towards viable scholarly avenues by 
which to examine unsuccessful bid cities.  In the last twenty years, pressure has mounted on 
the International Olympic Committee to secure positive long-term impacts for Host Cities.  The 
IOC passes the charge onto the bid cities through changes made in the requirements for the 
official bidding materials (the Candidature Files).  Candidate Cities, those bidding for hosting a 
Games, are now required to place particular emphasis on the long-term effect of hosting on their 
metropolis.  Cities have responded to the charge in three main ways when they bid:
1. By tailoring large-scale infrastructure investment to future transportation and population.
2. By siting permanent stadia sensitively and using temporary stadia structures whenever 
deemed necessary.
3. By renovating existing structures or infrastructure whenever possible.
As a result, recent Summer Olympic Games development plans have been calibrated to 
maximize potential positive impacts on the long-term health of the Host City, and likewise to 
minimize potential negative impacts.
 Host Cities can achieve positive long-term effects because of the Games’ unique 
combination of large amounts of spending, international expectations or scrutiny and local 
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enthusiasm, employment, and investment.  However, Candidate Cities that are not selected as 
Host Cities have not yet been recognized in scholarly circles as having similar transformative 
potential tied to their Olympic involvement.  
 This thesis aims to analyze whether unsuccessful Candidate Cities’ Olympic Bids act 
as unique opportunities for policy achievement – as policy windows, to use John W. Kingdon’s 
terminology.1   If unsuccessful Candidate Cities are shown to act according to Kingdon’s Policy 
Streams Approach framework, Olympic Bids can be recognized as transformative planning 
nexuses in their own right.  The argument for going through the time-consuming, costly, and 
polarizing bid process can be strengthened, and planners can learn how to recognize other 
policy window opportunities.
1 John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (New York: HarperCollins, 1997).
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II. BACKGROUND
A.  The Historic Context of the Olympic Games
 The Modern Olympic Games have strong roots in the Ancient Greek tradition of the 
Olympiad.  Historians believe that the Greeks held the first Olympiad, a celebration of athletics 
and culture, as early as 776 BC.  The Olympiads contributed to the spread of Hellenistic culture 
throughout the Mediterranean, but came to an end as the Roman Empire embraced Christianity. 
Christian Romans suppressed the “pagan” Olympiads to help install Christianity as the state 
religion of Rome. 
 In the late nineteenth century, French aristocrat Baron Pierre de Coubertin (1863-1937) 
found references to the Olympiads of antiquity inspiring for his own work to promote European 
nationalism as the continent navigated the challenging processes of industrialization.  Coubertin 
believed that large-scale athletics could reduce conflict in his native France, and could reduce 
the “conflict between nations” if spread internationally.2    Eventually, Coubertin rejected French 
nationalism for a focus on international common ground through athletic spectacle.  He proposed 
an updated Olympic Games that would marry the ideals of the ancient Olympiad – civic pride, 
religion, ideals of art and patriotism – with the emerging potential of nationalist fervor in a highly 
ceremonial and symbolic athletic extravaganza.  
 In 1892, Coubertin delivered a lecture at the Sorbonne that introduced his idea to the 
sporting and political public.  He claimed that modern athletics had been democratized and 
internationalized, drawing on examples of the English athletic system and the rapid diffusion of 
physical education across the globe.  He suggested that while athletics was usually understood 
as a suitable preparation for war, it should rather be considered an investment in future peace:
It is clear that the telegraph, railways, the telephone, the passionate research in 
science, congresses and exhibitions have done more for peace than any treaty or 
diplomatic convention.  Well, I hope that athletics will do even more… Let us export 
rowers, runners and fencers; there is the free trade of the future, and on the day 
when it is introduced within the walls of old Europe the cause of peace will have 
2 Hoberman, J. (1986) The Olympic Crisis.  Sport, Politics and the Moral Order.  New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas 
Publishing Co., Inc. p. 33.
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received a new and mighty stay.3 
On the strength of Coubertin’s ideas, the conference attendees – an elite group of royals, 
dignitaries, and representatives of sport associations – unanimously agreed to restore the 
Olympic Games and to establish a permanent International Olympic Committee (IOC).4 
 The first modern Olympiad took place four years later in Athens.  Every four years since 
that gathering in 1896, the Olympic Games have been held in the world’s greatest cities, with the 
exception of Games cancelled during World War I and World War II.  
B.  The International Olympic Committee
 The IOC was created by the vote at the 1892 Sorbonne conference and is the governing 
body of the Olympic Games and the leader of the Olympic movement.  It establishes and manages 
the rules for organization and participation in the Olympic Games, and functions as a non-profit 
organization with a mission to promote de Coubertin’s chief value – Olympism – throughout the 
world. 
 The IOC derives its power from the Olympic Charter, which outlines the body’s duties.  It 
is an appointed body of sports and diplomatic luminaries with broad decision-making powers for 
the future of the Games.  In addition to managing international participation in the Games and 
determining the program of sports competition offered during the Games, the IOC is responsible 
for coordinating the choosing of future Host Cities.
C.  Bidding: Determining the Games’ Host City
 Chief among the IOC’s duties are choosing a host city for each Olympic Games from 
among the cities of the countries that have participating National Olympic Committees (NOCs). 
Games are held every two years, with Summer and Winter Games alternating so that each 
happens on a four-year cycle.  The Games Host Cities have been chosen from an international 
bidding process since Coubertin’s first revitalized Games in 1896.  
3 Müller, Norbert. (2000).  Pierre de Coubertin 1863-1937: Olympism Selected Writings.  Norbert  Müller, Editing 
Director.  Lausanne: International Olympic Committee.
4 Seagrave, J. O. and Chu, D. (Eds.) (1988) The Olympic Games in Transition, Champaign, Ill: Human Kinetics.
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 Over time, the bidding process has become more codified and more exhaustive.  Since 
1992, the IOC has examined bids for five Summer Games, those occurring in 2000, 2004, 2008, 
2012 and 2016.  Candidate cities for these Games have represented a widening variety of 
countries and continents, and continue to reflect broader changes in the world’s socio-political 
and economic landscape.  IOC-established regulations for the bidding process – the Host City 
Election Procedure, in IOC parlance – have remained standard since 1999. 
 In common bidding practice, the application to host the Games is created and handled 
not by the city’s elected officials or staff, but by a Bid Committee.  This organization is a single-
purpose temporary not-for-profit entity created with the sole aim of securing the bid in that city. 
The Bid Committee hires staff and consultants to formulate the city’s Candidature file.  It acts as 
the host for the IOC’s Evaluation Commission visit.  If the bid succeeds, and the city is chosen 
as the Host City, the Bid Committee will likely become the foundation for the Host City’s Olympic 
Organizing Committee.  If the bid fails, the Bid Committee dissolves.
 Electing a Host City is a multi-year, multi-step process, open to all countries with a National 
Olympic Committee.  The election process is shown below in Figure 1.  In the first phase of 
election, cities in eligible countries petition their NOC to be the national representative at the 
international election process.  In some countries, such as the United States, this is a competitive 
process that requires cities to submit a written bid document to their NOC.   Approximately 10 
years prior to the Games, participating NOCs submit a bid on behalf of their Applicant City to the 
IOC.  Those bids are evaluated, and cut to a shortlist of Candidate Cities by the IOC Executive 
Board.  These bids are written submissions; there are no formal, in-person presentations made 
at this stage of the competition.  This process results in a small pool of between three and five 
Candidate Cities.
 The second phase for electing a Host city is the evaluation of the Candidate Cities leading 
up to the election of the Host City.  Candidate Cities are chosen eight years prior to the year of 
the Games. For example, Candidate Cities will be chosen in 2012 for the 2020 Summer Games. 
Cities accepted as Candidate Cities submit a written Candidature File to the IOC.  Also called 
a “Bid Book,” the Candidature File is the comprehensive planning and marketing document 
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that details the city’s plan for accommodating stadia, housing, permanent and temporary 
infrastructure, tourism, and comprehensive branding.  In this document, competing interests 
must meld to promote a seamless portrayal of the Candidate City as a strong Host City.   
Figure 1: Election and Planning Timeline
 The Candidature File Procedures require Candidate Cities to outline the entirety of the 
Olympic Games: venues, housing, media facilities, environmental and historic considerations, 
accommodations, transportation, medical services, anti-doping controls, security concerns, 
technological systems, energy resources, legal aspects, customs and immigration formalities, 
and finance and marketing.  The Candidate Files that result are highly specific, purpose-driven 
planning documents. 
 When deciding which Candidate City will be chosen as the Host City, the IOC pairs 
its review of Candidate Files with high-profile site visits by IOC members, National Olympic 
Committee members, Athletes’ Commission representatives, and other experts, who make the 
IOC’s Evaluation Committee.  This committee is the electoral body for Host Cities.  Candidate 
Cities take the IOC site visits as opportunities to convince the Evaluation Committee of their 
city’s particular suitability for hosting the Games.  
 The second phase is capped by the election of the Host City.   This happens as per the 
regulations set forth in the Olympic Charter, which states, “Save in exceptional circumstances, 
[the election of any Host City] takes place seven years before the celebration of the Olympic 
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Games.”5   The Evaluation Committee takes a series of votes after all site visits have been 
completed, knocking off lowest-voted cities until only one remains.  When the Host City has been 
chosen, its Bid Committee becomes an Olympic Organizing Committee.  Candidate Cities not 
chosen as the Host City disband their Bid Committees.
 In total, 37 cities have bid for the Summer Games since 1992.  Five have been chosen 
as Host Cities, and 16 were not chosen as Candidate Cities.  Fifteen cities gained Candidature 
status and were not chosen to host the Olympics.6   
D.  Legacy: the Result of the Games
 “Legacy” and “impact” are related yet non-identical concepts that are key to considering 
the long-term results of Olympic Games or of Games Bids.  City and bid officials have been 
cognizant of Games “legacy” for over fifty years, since the mayor of Melbourne affirmed in 1956 
that the city was ready to “establish, as a legacy of the XVI Olympiad, an Athletic Centre.”7   Andy 
Miah and Beatriz Garcia, authors of The Olympics: The Basics, contend that “impact” is the 
measurable, direct effects of the Games, whereas “legacy” refers to longer-term effects including 
feelings and impressions about Games.8 
 In recent years, the IOC has included requests that Candidate Cities provide what are 
termed “legacy” plans for all infrastructure projects, sporting venues and accommodations 
specifically.  These consist of specific plans and information that propose eventual re-purposing 
and long-term use of any changes to the built environment that comes with hosting the Games. 
The 2020 Candidature Acceptance Procedure, the most recent bid guidelines, recommend that 
venues “…be realistic with respect to the master plan of the Host City, resource efficiencies and 
5 International Olympic Committee.  2020 Candidate Acceptance Procedure: Games of the XXXIII Olympiad.  
Lausanne, Switzerland, 2011. http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Host_city_elections_2020_CAP.pdf.
6 1993 bid for the 2000 Games: Berlin, Istanbul, Manchester; 1997 bid for the 2004 Games: Buenos Aires, Cape 
Town, Rome, Stockholm; 2001 bid for the 2008 Games: Osaka, Paris, Toronto, 2005 bid for the 2012 Games: 
Madrid, Moscow, Paris, New York City; 2009 bid for the 2016 Games: Chicago, and Tokyo.  Applicant Cities or 
Candidature Cities for the 2013 bid for the 2020 Games are excluded from this analysis as the bid period is ongo-
ing at the time of this thesis’ construction.
7 Kiki Kaplanidou and Kostas Karadakis, “Understanding the Legacies of a Host Olympic City: The Case of the 
2010 Vancouver Olympic Games,” Sport Marketing Quarterly, 19 (2010): 110.




 The IOC has traditionally focused on promoting a culture of athleticism and goodwill. 
Olympic Charters from as early as 1908 denote the IOC’s duty to guide modern athleticism 
through the organization of grand celebratory events.10   While the Olympic Charter has, as 
other living documents, changed considerably since its earliest incarnations, language about the 
legacy of the Games was not added until 2003, when New York City and other cities bidding for 
the 2012 Games were formulating their bids.  The Olympic Charter from 2003 commits to a focus 
on legacy between giving similar attention to sport development and environmentalism: 
…takes measures to promote a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the 
host city and the host country, including a reasonable control of the size and 
cost of the Olympic Games, and encourages the Organizing Committees of the 
Olympic Games (OCOGs), public authorities in the host country and the persons 
or organizations belonging to the Olympic Movement to act accordingly.11
The following Olympic Charter in 2004 simplified the language considerably: “…to promote a 
positive legacy from the Olympic Games to host cities and host countries.”12   That language has 
remained constant to the present Olympic Charter, active since 2011.
 The change to the Olympic Charter was due in large part to a 2002 symposium held 
by the IOC to consider the legacy of the Games held between 1984 and 2000.  The results of 
the symposium suggested that more research was needed regarding legacy planning and the 
management of legacy programs.13    After the symposium, the IOC added the 14th mission 
statement to its charter that dictated the need for positive legacies that benefit the quality of life 
of the host city and country.
 The City of Vancouver, which gained the bid for the 2010 Winter Olympic Games in 2003 as 
the Olympic Charter changed, was faced with hitherto unprecedented focus on legacy planning 
during both the bid phases and the planning and construction phases.  Official candidature 
9 International Olympic Committee.  2020 Candidate Acceptance Procedure: Games of the XXXIII Olympiad.  
Lausanne, Switzerland, 2011: 59.
10 Comité International Olympique.  Annuaire: 1908.  Lausanne, Switzerland, 1908.
11 International Olympic Committee, Olympic Charter, Lausanne, Switzerland (2003): 12.
12 International Olympic Committee, Olympic Charter, Lausanne, Switzerland (2004): 12.
13 Kiki Kaplanidou and Kostas Karadakis, “Understanding the Legacies of a Host Olympic City: The Case of the 
2010 Vancouver Olympic Games,” Sport Marketing Quarterly, 19 (2010): 110.
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questionnaires now ask specifically about the expected legacy of the event as a result of winning 
the bid.  Vancouver handled this by being the first candidate city to create a legacy organization 
separate from the bid committee.  Called 2010 Legacies Now, the organization had authority for 
legacy development associated with bidding and hosting of the Games, and was to remain active 
even if the city did not win the right to host the Games.14   Vancouver has proven a useful model 
for other Host Cities to follow.  The City of London created the London Legacy Development 
Corporation to accompany its bid, and has entered its post-Games process with the a very open 
legacy development website to publicize its work.  Nonetheless, both Vancouver and London’s 
legacy development organizations were paired to successful Olympic bids.
14 Becca Leopkey, “Expert Case: Legacy and Sustainability at the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic Games,” in 
Milena M. Parent and Sharon Smith-Swan, editors, Managing Major Sports Events: Theory and Practice, Oxon, 
Canada: Routledge, 305.
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III.  LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Policy Window Analysis
 The Olympics are, at the surface level, the marriage of sporting talent and dedication. 
However, the two weeks of the Games are the culmination of years of coordination, planning, 
negotiations, development, renovation, and spending.  The processes and partnerships that lead 
to the bid, to newly built or renovated structures, and to the economic development initiatives 
in the Candidate of Host Cities are the public and the private sector partnerships.  Although a 
successful Games bid is often sufficient impetus for significant policy change, other opportunities 
are not so readily identified.  In order to serve their citizenry, governments must be able to 
recognize which issues are likely to move successfully from social to political agendas, and can 
carry the support of public and private stakeholders.15 
 By studying the mechanics of the policy changes that accompany undertaking an Olympic 
Bid, we can gain important information on the effectiveness of agenda-setting and policy 
formulation in cyclical, long-term planning for sporting and culture events.  The findings of this 
thesis on the Olympic Bid as a policy window will help public policy analysts, sport advocates, 
elected officials, and civil servants at many levels of government gauge the merit of bidding as a 
strategy for catalyzing urban growth or redevelopment.
 John W. Kingdon’s study of United States federal policymaking, originally published in 
1984, is the framework for policy analysis that attempts to demystify the complex intersection 
of political agendas and timeliness that affects all possible policies.  His work, widely known as 
policy window analysis or policy streams analysis, has become the standard of analysis in policy 
studies across multiple disciplines.16 
 Kingdon identifies three streams - problems, policies, and politics - that, when coupled 
by an actor functioning as a policy entrepreneur, trigger the opening of a policy window that 
15 Michael Howlett, “Predictable and Unpredictable Policy Windows: Institutional and Exogenous Correlates of 
Canadian Federal Agenda-Setting,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 41 (1998): 495.
16 Howlett, 497.
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facilitates policy change.17   Similar to a launch window for a NASA shuttle, the policy window is 
fleeting in duration.  Unlike launch windows, policy windows are exceedingly difficult to predict. 
Kingdon’s work on identifying the factors that create an amenable environment for policy action 
helps those stakeholders who might function as policy entrepreneurs more readily recognize 
a policy window opening so they may take advantage of it and promote their preferred policy 
alternative.
 The three streams Kingdon lays out develop independently and float around in the ether 
of the policy world until a policy entrepreneur couples them.  The Problem Stream consists of 
public matters requiring attention,18  where issues are identified and recognized based either on 
commonly agreed indicators or because of focusing events.19   The Policy Stream is made of 
the disparate policy communities producing alternatives and proposals.20   The Political Stream 
contains political issues, shifts in public opinions, administrations, and interest groups that 
determine actor receptivity.21   Each of these streams functions continuously flows.  However, 
the streams do not frequently overlap or join. 
 Policy windows, Kingdon notes, are responsible for all major changes in public policy 
found in his research on United States federal legislation.  He brings up a compelling example: 
the Goldwater debacle (a problem stream) resulted in more liberal Democratic seats in Congress, 
creating a window of problem, policy and politics that allowed President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
Great Society Initiatives to turn into active legislation.22   In Kingdon’s parlance, the individual 
program policies constituting the Great Society Initiatives transferred from the Government 
Agenda to the Decision Agenda.  The Government Agenda is the list of all the subjects people 
in and around the government are paying attention to at any given point in time.  The Decision 
Agenda is a subset of those items the government is actively deliberating.23    A policy window 
17 Karin Guldbrandsson and Bjöörn Fossum, “An Exploration of the Theoretical Concepts Policy Windows and 
Policy Entrepreneurs at the Swedish Public Health Arena,” Health Promotion Internaional 24 (2009): 434.
18 Guldbrandsson and Fossum, 434.
19 Ann M. Galligan and Chris N. Burgess, “Moving Rivers, Shifting Streams: Perspectives on the Existence of a 
Policy Window” (paper presented at the 29th Annual Social Theory, Politics and the Arts Conference, Columbus, 
Ohio, October 9, 2003).
20 Galligan and Burgess, 435.
21 Ibid., 435.
22 John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, 2nd ed., New York: Longman, 1995, 166.
23 Kingdon 166.
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can take a policy from the chaotic ether to the Government Agenda and thence onto the Decision 
Agenda, but it does not ensure enactment or favorable bureaucratic decision.
 Policy windows, the complex combination of the three streams, open because of triggers 
in the political or the problem stream.  Politically, a change of administration or the turnover of 
any political actor presents the opportunity for a change in policy direction.  When a problem 
becomes pressing, proposal advocates – the policy entrepreneurs – attach their solutions to it. 
For example, lines at gas stations bring attention to energy shortages.  Transportation interests 
seize the change in conversation to present their programs as a solution or partial solution.24   In 
the context of Olympic bids, policy entrepreneurs may identify the lack of sporting infrastructure 
as a ‘problem’ and attach their stadia development plans or economic development programs to 
the bid talks.
 According to Kingdon, policy windows close for a variety of reasons, all tied to a loss of 
sense of urgency and momentum surrounding the policies in question.  Participants may feel 
that they have addressed the problem.  They may fail to get action, and resign themselves to 
inaction.  The events that precipitated the window may expire.  New events or political actors 
may wrest attention from the precipitating event.  No appropriate alternative may rise to the 
surface.25   Without the prospect of a positive outcome for a policy window, participants may 
abandon their work.
 The glues that bind the streams of politics, policies and problems together are the Policy 
Entrepreneurs.  Kingdon defines these mercurial actors as “advocates who are willing to invest 
their resources – time, energy, reputation, money – to promote a position in return for anticipated 
future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits.”26   Policy entrepreneurs can 
be any number of stakeholders: public officials, elected officials, external lobbyists, citizens, or 
researchers who are active in the problem and the policy streams.27 




27 Guldbrandsson and Fossum, 435.
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 Many disciplines turn to Kingdon’s policy streams model to analyze areas, programs 
and events of interest.  When considering analyzing Olympic Bids as potential policy windows, 
Joyce Lieberman’s work presents itself as a replicable model using an historical qualitative case 
study.28   Looking to identify the problem and political strains that led to a massive 1995 reform of 
the Chicago Public Schools leadership, Lieberman sought to identify the key processes, players 
and events that led to the development and passage of new legislation.  
 The Historical Qualitative Case Study model consists of document review with content 
analysis of both primary and secondary sources, and participant interviews.29   Content analysis, 
according to Marshall and Rossman, is “best thought of as an overall approach, a method, 
and an analytic strategy [that]… entails the systematic examination of forms of communication 
to document patterns objectively.”30   Lieberman scoured legislative reports, transcripts, and 
newspaper articles for mentions of the case and associated themes.  She supplemented the 
historical research with interviews with a variety of key players involved in agenda-setting 
and policy formulation in the mid-1990’s in Chicago.  Marshall and Rossman note that “…
typically, qualitative in-depth interviews are much more like conversations than formal events 
with predetermined response categories…the participant’s perspective…should unfold as the 
participant views it, not as the researcher views it.” 31
 Lieberman’s use of the Historic Qualitative Case Study methodology allows her to 
succinctly identify the four necessary elements of the Kingdon policy streams analysis.  She 
constructs the problem with historical context, identifies the existing alternatives as the policy 
potentials, describes the political context, and names the policy entrepreneurs who coupled the 
streams to produce a policy window for legislative change.    
 The Historic Qualitative Case Study model allows the researcher to break away from 
rigid interviewing methodology, freeing the possibility that unforeseen insights and conversation 
topics can arise.  With a limited study period, this type of methodological flexibility can help 
28 Joyce M. Lieberman, “Three Streams and Four Policy Entrepreneurs Converge: A Policy Window Opens,” 
Education and Urban Society 34 (2002): 438-450.
29 Lieberman, 442.
30 C. Marshall and G.B. Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research, 2nd ed., (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 
1995), quoted in Lieberman, 441.
31 Marshall and Rossman , 80, in Lieberman, 442.
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researchers gain insights quickly that can lead to a more well-rounded research product.
C. The Extent of Focus on Unsuccessful Bids
 To date, there has been little specific research on analyzing or comparing unsuccessful 
Olympic Games bids.  Most researchers choose instead to focus on successful bids and Games: 
in no large part because of the availability of data.  The Olympic researchers John and Margaret 
Gold have made extensive studies on the implications and significances of being an Olympic 
city.  The Golds focus on the spectacle and grandeur of the Games, tracing the development of 
the pageantry of hosting from the Games’ inception to present.32 
 Other Olympic researchers have made comprehensive reviews of Olympic cities.  Stephen 
Essex and Brian Chalkley group the entire span of the modern Games, from 1896 to 1996, into 
chronologic periods by transformative planning nature.  They characterize “low-impact” Games 
as those where organizers sought to keep expenditure to a minimum, relying to a large degree 
on existing sports facilities.  The first three Games – Athens 1896, Paris 1900 and St. Louis 1904 
– fall into this category.33   The second category consists of those Games “focusing on additional 
sporting facilities”.  Preparations for these Games included major new sports facilities, but only 
modest changes to the city’s wider environment and infrastructure.  Games from London in 1908 
to Helsinki in 1952 (a Winter Games) fall into this category.  
 Starting with Melbourne in 1956, Essex and Chalkley identify Games that focused on 
additional sports infrastructure and “stimulat[ed] transformations of the built environment.”  Some 
cities – like Atlanta in 1996 - already had substantial civic infrastructure, and others, such as 
Tokyo in 1964 and Barcelona in 1992,required  transformative efforts to host the Games.34   Their 
work provides a useful catalogue of Olympic cities grouped by the strength of their transformative 
nature on the urban environment and its infrastructure.  Furthermore, Essex and Chalkley point 
to the examination of unsuccessful bidders as a further direction for research, noting, “…an 
32 John R. Gold and Margaret M. Gold, Cities of Culture: Staging International Festivals and the Urban Agenda, 
1851-2000, Burington, VT: Ashgate, 2005, 143.




intriguing issue here would be to assess the legacy and effects of bidding and failing.”35 
D. Research Models for Comparative Olympic Scholarship
 To take up Essex and Chalkley’s challenge and frame research on unsuccessful Olympic 
bids, I was guided by the examples of those researchers who have delved into similar fields with 
similar data.  Olympic researchers take one of three main research approaches: comprehensive 
chronological surveys, single-city case studies, and multi-city case studies.  
 The work of Essex and Chalkley falls into the first category.36    Several of their articles 
lay out the Games held from 1896 to 1996, considering each briefly in the matter of the local 
Olympic Organizing Committee’s goals and what kinds of buildings, infrastructure developments 
or political changes were effected as a result of the Games.  This approach allows them, as 
well other researchers to pan through Olympic History and make sweeping statements about 
the legacies of Games. In their attempt to identify factors indicating success of Olympic Games 
bids, Feddersen, Maenning and Zimmermann attempt to analyze all Games since the Games 
recommenced in 1896.  They characterized five large phases of Olympic development, delineated 
by macro-level geo-political trends.37   
 Similarly, Noam Shoval divides the world’s Olympic Games and World’s Fairs in his 
scholarship into four grand periods.  He argues that the fourth period of mega-event development, 
from 2000 to the present, is that between cities and their metropolitan areas for resources such 
as tourists and international companies, not between nations and empires for hegemony. He 
concludes, as the cities of the world transition to service-based economies, so too do their 
reasons for seeking to host the Games.38 
 A useful approach is to gather information chronologically and impose categories so as to 
broadly characterize the Games’ impact on Host Cities.  However, this methodological approach 
35 Ibid., 204.
36 Ibid., 191-200; Stephen Esssex and Brian Chalkley, “Urban Development through Hosting International 
Events: A History of the Olympic Games,” Planning Perspectives, 14 (2008): 374-389.
37 Arne Feddersen, Wolfgang Maenning and Phillipp Zimmermann, “The Empirics of Key Factors in the Suc-
cess of Bids for the Olympic Games,“ Revue d’économie politique, 118 (2008): 172-174.
38 Noam Shoval, “A New Phase in the Competition for the Olympic Gold: The London and New York Bids for the 
2012 Games, “ Journal of Urban Affairs, 24 (2002): 591.
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has limited efficacy if the researcher’s aim is to examine more specific aspects of the bids or 
outcomes of individual Games.  
 Single-city case studies provide more guidance in taking a closer analytical look at the 
successes and failures of Games (or bids) and lie at the other extreme of the methodological 
options.  Considering only a single case allows researchers the opportunity to delve more deeply 
into the aims, mechanics, and outcomes of a Games or a bid with a more attentive consideration 
of their socio-political and geo-economic context.  
 Several academics have considered the Cape Town 2004 bid to examine specific aspects 
of Olympic bid scholarship.  Harry H. Hiller chose Cape Town’s bid as a lens through which 
to analyze the effect of massive infrastructure development as a strategy for gaining popular 
support for a mega-event.39   By contrast, Kamilla Swart and Urmilla Bob chose Cape Town as a 
case study for examining the effects of mega-events on developing countries.  They concluded 
that developing cities, under the current structure and processes of the Olympic Games and the 
Olympic Movement, may never have the chance to realize goals of hosting the Games, or any 
other mega-event.40   
 Steven Tufts studied the Toronto 2008 bid, specifically eliciting the role of the active 
political factions in supporting or detracting from the bid.  Tufts found that labor unions in Toronto 
generally supported the bid.  He determined that labor in Canada remains an active agent in 
processes shaping contemporary Toronto.41   Unless individual case studies are aggregated, 
however, it will be extremely difficult for planners to draw lessons and advice for future best 
practices.
 A middle path, methodologically speaking, is the multi-city case study model.  Researchers 
who choose to examine, compare and contrast several cities’ Games or bids take one aspect of 
analysis (political, economic, or built environment) and draw conclusions that withstand criticism 
39 Harry H. Hiller, “Mega-Events, Urban Boosterism and Growth Strategies: An Analysis of the Objectives and 
Legitimations of the Cape Town 2004 Olympic Bid,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 24 
(2000): 439-458.
40 Kamilla Swart and Urmilla Bob, “The Seductive Discourse of Development: The Cape Town 2004 Olympic 
Bid, “Third World Quarterly, 25 (2004): 1322.
41 Steven Tufts, “Building the ‘Competitive City:’ Labour and Toronto’s Bid to Host the Olympic Games,” Geofo-
rum 35 (2004): 47-58.
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better than those that come from a single-event analysis.  Shoval, in comparing the New York 
City and London bids for the 2012 games, focused on the bids as unique from the vast majority 
because they come from major cities that are established centers of economic activity, culture, 
sports and tourism.42   
 Both Torres and Masterman analyze the kinds of legacies that a Games or a bid can result 
in for a city.  Torres finds a growing sector of cities – Manchester, Lille and Chicago, for example 
– which have successfully turned an unsuccessful Olympic bid into commendable legacy in 
terms of active structures or programming.43   Yet, Torres does not enumerate what caused such 
robust legacy, or even speculate as to its causes.  Indeed, he cautions against cities bidding 
as a means to an end, acts he feels would diminish the Olympic ideals.44   By contrast, Guy 
Masterman argues from his study of multiple cities that have recently bid for the Games for a 
process of multiple bids: a first bid to develop important relationships and lay institutional and 
planning groundwork, and future bids made on the strengths built by those preliminary actions.45 
E. Hybrid Methodological Model
 This thesis investigated whether selected Olympic Bids function as policy windows.  The 
strength of the multi-city case study model is that it allows detailed analysis of a limited number 
of factors in a way that creates easy pathways for comparison and recommendations. By 
applying the Historical Qualitative Case Study methodology to the multi-city case study model, 
I aggregated my findings from the individual bids and characterized the recent Olympic bids 
as a whole with regards to their role vis-à-vis urban planning practices in case study cities, 
analyzing their propensity to act as policy windows.  I analyzed findings from my research to 
create recommendations for future bid cities so as to maximize the transformative nature of the 
bid process.
42 Shoval, 585.
43 Cesar R. Torres, “On the Merit of the Legacy of Failed Olympic Bids,” Kinesiology, Sport Studies and Physi-
cal Education Presentations and Papers, 2012, Paper 4, 14.
44 Torres, 17.
45 Guy Masterman, “Losing Bids, Winning Legacies: An Examination of the Need to Plan for Olympic Legacies 
Prior to the Bidding,” in Pathways: Critiques and Discourse in Olympic Research, ed. Robert K. Barney, Michael 
K, Heine, Kevin B. Wamsley, and Gordon H. MacDonald, London, Ontario: The University of Western Ontario, 
2008: 172.
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IV.  RESEARCH DESIGN
 This thesis studied unsuccessful Olympic Games bids, determining whether or not these 
bids have acted as policy windows under Kingdon’s defintion.  Although the Modern Olympic 
Games have been held since 1896, I considered those cities bidding in what Noam Shoval calls 
the fourth phase of Olympic history, from 2000 forwards.  Shoval found that these Olympics are 
characteristic of the competition between cities and their metropolitan areas for resources such 
as tourists and international companies, not between differing nations or empires for global 
hegemony.46  
 In the interests of comparing cities with similar statuses, political players, and planning 
mechanisms (although certainly not identical), only North American cities are included.  No 
city that achieved the bid, thereby hosting the Games, is included.  These constraints result in 
a group of three unsuccessful bid cities: Toronto (TOR2008), New York City (NYC2012), and 
Chicago (CHI2016).  
For a detailed understanding of the scope of each city’s bid, I examined each city’s Official 
Candidature File.  These documents are the official bid organization group’s legal submission to 
the International Olympic Committee.  They comprise the city’s plans for how it will accommodate 
the Games, and identify all planned infrastructure and development projects that affect the 
Games’ proposed site and its related infrastructure.  Identifying projects officially attached to 
each city’s bid allowed me to differentiate Olympics-specific policy changes from policy changes 
that are a result of a possible policy window.  
 To complete a content analysis similar to Joyce Lieberman’s as part of the Historical 
Quantitative Case Study model, I collected primary, secondary, and interview evidence.  I 
established a seven-year time window leading up to each city’s bid year when collecting primary 
and secondary data.  (See Table 1.)  Focusing on the years leading up to the bid allowed me 
to capture previously-extant policies, problems, political scenarios and actors that may have 




Primary sources consist of each city’s Official Candidature File.  Additionally, I collected secondary 
data on policy decisions and the bid process from a variety of sources.  I consulted major city 
City Start Year End Year 
Toronto 1994 2001 
New York 1998 2005 
Chicago 2002 2009 
	  
Table 1: Research Time Periods
Table 2: Research Periodicals by City
City Newspapers 
Toronto 
Toronto Sun, Toronto Globe and Mail, Toronto 
Star 
New York 
New York Times, New York Post, Wall Street 
Journal, Crain’s New York Business 
Chicago 
Chicago Sun-Times, Chicago Tribune, Crain’s 
Chicago Business 
	  
newspapers for Toronto, New York and Chicago, found via database searches.  (See Table 2).
 I examined reports from each city’s bid organizations, as well as reports from the cities’ 
development communities and policy advocates.  I additionally collected secondary data from 
miscellaneous documents found in Internet searches.
 My third sources of data were qualitative interviews.  I interviewed members of city planning 
staff, of the city’s bid committee, or an elected official to articulate the spaces in between the 
data provided by bid records and the news reports.  I used the snowball method to generate 
interviewees.
 To analyze this evidence, I used the Marshall and Rossman model of content analysis as 
practiced by Lieberman.47   I have identified themes centered on the streams and actors central 
to a policy streams analysis framework, and categorized my primary and secondary source 
data thematically.  This approach allowed me to identify the problems, politics, and policies at 
47 Lieberman, 441.
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play in each city during the research window.  I attempted to identify policy entrepreneurs and 
characterize whether the bid acted as a catalyst for a policy window to open.  
 My final task was to formulate recommendations based on my research of Olympic bids 
and policy windows.  I address my recommendations to two groups: city planners and city 
legislators.  I will empower these officials with the knowledge of how effectively an Olympic 
bid can function as a policy window.  These officials will be able to identify policy window 
characteristics of future Olympic bids or other mega-events, and will be equipped to act as or 
empower policy entrepreneurs.  Thus, future mega-event bids may be more widely used as 
strategies for launching planning and development initiatives by public and private sectors in 
North American cities. 
 The research design described in this section was submitted to the Institutional Review 
Board of Columbia University for approval.  The design was submitted in January of 2013, and 
was approved in February of 2013.
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V.  CASE STUDY ANALYSES
 The three case studies are examined individually in this section.  We will peruse a short 
history of their bid, major characters and actors involved in the bids, the projects and policies 
they propose, and the eventual outcome of those projects, programs and policies.   We can 
then compare the individual bids, as they are all responses to the same challenge issued by the 
IOC.  The requirements for submitting a bid have stayed remarkably stable throughout the time 
periods noted for the Toronto, New York, and Chicago bids. 
 At the heart of the complex and highly demanding requirements for Olymipc bids are 
specific needs for physical facilities for housing and sporting, venues for media activities, and 
accommodations for country team members.  The IOC requires that the Candidature file show 
cities’ plans for current, future, or temporary facilities of the following types: 
1. Indoor facilities seating between 5,000 and 15,000 for boxing, wrestling, weightlifting, 
table tennis, badminton, judo, fencing and taekwondo.
2. Indoor arenas seating more than 15,000 for gymnastics, basketball, volleyball and 
handball.
3. Indoor facilities for aquatic sports (swimming, diving, synchronized swimming, and water 
polo) and track cycling.
4. Outdoor stadia for football and field hockey
5. Outdoor facilities for equestrian events, mountain biking, rowing, whitewater canoeing, 
sailing, shooting, tennis, baseball, softball, archery, and beach volleyball.
6. An Olympic Stadium seating at least 80,000 to host the Opening and Closing Ceremonies, 
the athletics events, and football finals.
7. An Olympic Village with more than 4,000 units
8. More than 1.5 million square feet of media facilities, housing an International Broadcast 
Center and a Main Press Center.48 
48 Moss, 5; International Olympic Committee, Manual for Candidate Cities of the Games of the XXIX Olympiad 
2008: Part 2 – Candidature File – Questionnaire, Lausanne, Switzerland: 2000; International Olympic Commit-
tee, 2012 Candidate Procedure and Questionnaire: Games of the XXX Olympiad in 2012, Lausanne, Switzerland: 
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 The IOC’s main priority for a bid document is that it displays a realistic commitment to 
being able to host the sporting and media needs of an Olympic Games with stadia and facilities. 
The more recent focus on the bid city’s plans for a Games’ “legacy” is important component 
of the bid.  However, a city’s legacy plan for the Games remains less important in the IOC’s 
decision-making matrix than its stated ability to host the short-term event.
A.  Toronto 2008
 Toronto’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games followed an unsuccessful bid for the 1996 
Olympic Games (See Figure 2).  This earlier attempt planned to capitalize on Toronto’s wealth 
of existing sporting and mega-event infrastructure, particularly the Canadian National Exhibition 
Grounds, southwest of the city center on the Lake Ontario waterfront.  49 The bid presented for 
the 2008 Games took a more radical approach, rejecting the existing (badly aging) infrastructure 
for the chance to invest heavily in center-city-proximate brownfield site of the Port Lands.
2004; International Olympic Committee, Candidature Acceptance Procedure: Games of the XXXI Olympiad in 
2016, Lausanne, Switzerland: 2007.
49 Robert Douglas Oliver, “Bidding for the Future: Toronto’s 2008 Olympic bid and the Regulation of Waterfront 
Land,” PhD diss., Queen’s University, Ontario, Canada: 2008, 149.
Figure 2: Toronto’s Candidate City Logo (TO-Bid)
Robson 23
 The Toronto 2008 bid was linked to the tumultuous history of the city’s waterfront and 
assorted pressures and programs to redevelop that area.  In 1988, the federal government of 
Canada created a Royal Commission to re-evaluate the federal government’s role in regulating 
waterfront land in Toronto as a reaction to the city’s decline and the poor quality of its waterfront. 
The Commissions’ founding documents cited the city’s “poor management” and the absence of 
a “coherent vision” as factors restricting the waterfront’s potential.50   The commission issuing 
these statements was only made up of one person: former Toronto Mayor David Crombie.  
 Crombie studied, made recommendations, and planned for the city’s former industrial areas 
on the waterfront for almost a decade in various public roles.  He served as the Commissioner 
for Toronto’s Waterfront and as the head of the Waterfront Regeneration Trust, a spin-off agency 
created at the Commission’s decline to continue its work.  At some point during those ten years 
of commitment to Toronto’s industrial waterfront, Crombie latched onto the idea of pairing the 
need for waterfront redevelopment with the potential inherent in an Olympic Bid.  
 By 1998, Crombie also led the 2008 Toronto Olympic Bid Corporation (BIDCO).  BIDCO 
and the Waterfront Regeneration Trust were difficult to distinguish between in the early days of 
the 2008 bid, as BIDCO operated out of the Waterfront Regeneration Trust offices.51   BIDCO 
members knew early on that the waterfront was considered key to the bid concept at multiple 
levels of governance: Jeff Evenson, former Central Waterfront Director of the Waterfront 
Regeneration Trust and BIDCO member, stated, “The point was to … build a project which 
focused and concentrated people, money and ideas on the waterfront.”52   The commitment to 
rejuvenating the Toronto industrial waterfront through an Olympic bid received support from the 
Canadian Olympic Association (COA).53   
 The waterfront focus helped to bring the Toronto 2008 bid in line with the IOC’s larger 
goals for the physical legacy of the Olympic Games.  Since the early 1990s, the IOC has asked 
bids to more stringently prove that their plans will leave a tangible urban redevelopment legacy. 
Usually, bids that cluster venues and facilities and position their developments to regenerate 





underutilized areas or remediate brownfield sites are more often found to match the IOC’s 
interests. 
 The waterfront focus remained a centerpiece of the Toronto bid through its rejection by the 
IOC in 2001.  The concept was bolstered by new research reports from Toronto’s City Planning 
Department and buoyed by political support from city, provincial, and national government. 
When the bid concept was presented to Toronto’s City Council in March of 1998, councilors 
(including Brad Duguid) found the idea a positive step for the city.54   In 1998, Toronto Bid (TO-Bid) 
supplanted BIDCO as the official bid organization.  Although the Toronto Harbor Commission, 
the authority over the city’s waterfront, had rejected BIDCO’s preliminary design concept, TO-
Bid argued to keep it.  
 David Crombie’s BIDCO was no longer the official bid organization, but Crombie continued 
to support TO-Bid’s work in promoting the waterfront bid concept.  Crombie seemed more 
committed than ever to the bid idea: “… the east side of the waterfront is where we have been 
begging for a future for so long, but it has been tied up in jurisdictional knots and no one’s been 
able to crack through.  This is a real opportunity to force the issue.”55    
 TO-Bid’s Master Plan, unveiled in the fall of 1999, continued to privilege the waterfront as 
a place of investment and renewal.  It focused three rings of activity along the waterfront, shown 
in Figure 3:
1. A ring around the Canadian National Exhibition Grounds and Ontario Place
2. A ring around the central waterfront near the SkyDome and Air Canada Centre
3. An Eastern ring around the Port Lands, the planned home of Olympic-specific venues.
This master plan mirrored goals coming out of the Toronto City Planning Department, allowing 
it smoother passage through the political channels.  Chief Urban Planner for the City of Toronto 
Paul Bedford supported the plan, arguing that the Olympics would address pressing problems of 
environmental remediation and integrate the Port Lands into the existing urban fabric.  In short, 
Bedford characterized the TO-Bid Master Plan as “consistent with emergent planning.”56 
54 Ibid., 194.
55 David Crombie, 1999, quoted in Oliver 2008, 228.





























 By the spring of 2001, the boundaries between Olympic planning and waterfront planning 
were so thoroughly blurred that the prospect of a failed bid began to create worry among 
journalists and citizens.  When the IOC picked Beijing, China, over Toronto later in the year, 
there was widespread recognition of the need to seize the momentum provided by the Olympic 
planning process and proceed with ambitious waterfront development.  However, Crombie saw 
his decades of work end abruptly in the early 2000’s: without the pressure of the Games, the 
spirit of collaborative and innovative planning failed.  
 Of course, the waterfront does not fully constitute the Toronto 2008 bid.  Both the BIDCO 
and the TO-Bid plans included waterfront redevelopment along with the renovation or reuse of 
existing stadia and sport-specific facilities.  The immediate failure of waterfront development is 
apparent, but so are the additional failures of renovations or adaptations for existing facilities. 
(See Table 3).
 Table 3 shows the project sites identified by BIDCO for the Toronto 2008 bid.  Sites 
existing at the time of the bid are noted.  At the 2013 analysis year, sites were categorized by 
their physical outcome.  No sites were found to have been constructed or renovated according to 
the plans for the Toronto 2008 bid.  However, six sites planned for Toronto 2008 were folded into 
the bid for the 2015 PanAm Games, and are noted in red.  The demolition, modified construction, 
and use of these venues can be read as being due in part to the widespread publication of the 
Toronto 2008 bid.
 The coda to the Toronto 2008 bid is the eventual success of the city’s bid to host the 2015 
Pan-American Games.  Also a quadrennial multi-sport mega-event, the Pan-Am Games are 
open to competitors from countries in North and South America.  Toronto’s sports facilities and 
stadia sector is currently experiencing a construction and renovation boom to accommodate the 
two weeks of Pan-Am competition, including many of the venues originally identified for either 
the 1996 or 2008 bid.  By hosting the Pan-Am Games, Toronto may be able to make a more 
convincing bid for a future Summer Games in the years ahead. 
 Toronto’s waterfront, the centerpiece of the city’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, has 











































































































































































government in Toronto – federal, provincial, and municipal – committed support to waterfront 
revitalization in 2001.  In November of that year, the governments created Waterfront Toronto 
(then known as the Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation) to oversee planning and 
development of the waterfront in Toronto.  The organization was backed by the support of 
provincial and municipal legislation in 2002 and 2003, solidifying its place as the permanent 
independent organization to oversee and lead the renewal of the industrial waterfront in Toronto.57 
 Waterfront Toronto has a 25-year mandate to transform the 2,000 acres of brownfield 
lands on the waterfront into sustainable mixed-use communities and dynamic public spaces.  At 
the 2013 analysis year, two waterfront communities (East Bayfront and West Don Lands) are 
underway.  Together, these projects are planned to bring 12,000 residential units, 28 acres of 
parkland, and transit-accessible cultural and employment destinations to construction, including 
the Athlete’s Village for the 2015 PanAm Games.58   The 2008 bid is widely regarded to be the 
catalyst for the reinvention of the industrial waterfront in Toronto; it did act as a policy window, 
allowing problem and policy streams to come together.
B.  New York City 2012
 The New York City Olympic bid had its roots in the 1990’s-era regeneration of New York 
and the aspirations of private-sector actors to mark that transformation on an international stage. 
Investment banker Daniel Doctoroff brought a proposal for a New York City-based Olympic Games 
to the city’s Mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, in the mid-1990s.  In 1996, Mayor Giuliani appointed a task 
force to study a New York Bid for the 2008 Games, boosting Doctoroff’s plans and providing the 
first official New York City Olympic planning opportunity ever.59   However, this early effort was 
cut short when the United States Olympic Committee decided to forgo participating in the bids 
57 Waterfront Toronto, “History and Heritage,” WaterfrontToronto.ca, accessed May 9, 2013. http://www.waterfr-
ontoronto.ca/about_us/history_and_heritage
58 Waterfront Toronto, “Explore Projects,” WaterfrontToronto.ca, accessed May 9, 2013, http://www.waterfronto-
ronto.ca/explore_projects
59 Michael Cooper, “New York Studies Bid for Olympics,” The New York Times, New York, June 28, 1996, 
Section 1, page 27, in Mitchell Moss, “How NYC Won the Olympics,” Rudin Center for Transportation Policy and 
Management, Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, New York University, 2011, 4.
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for the 2008 Games at the national level.60   New York City’s Olympic planning ambitions would 
have to shift to a later Games, new goals, and a new timeframe.
 Doctoroff then founded and led NYC2012, a non-profit organization to lead New York 
City’s bid, until he was appointed by Giuliani successor Mayor Michael Bloomberg to become 
the city’s Deputy Mayor for Economic Development in 2001.61   The NYC2012 logo is shown 
in Figure 4.  Coordination between the non-profit, public, and private sectors led to success at 
the national level in 2002 when the United States Olympic Committee selected New York City 
as the U.S. Candidate City for the 2012 Olympic Games.62   In 2005, the International Olympic 
Committee selected London, not New York, as the Host City from a pool of finalists including 
Madrid, Moscow, and Paris.  
 New York City’s bid was consciously planned as a document that would, in the Toronto 
model, propose development interventions for underutilized areas.  However, NYC2012 made 
public claims that their bid projects would be pursued with or without the eventual success 
of the bid at the IOC decision level.  To ensure the success of this commitment, bid leaders 
60 Jere Longman, ”Olympics: Bids by U.S. Cities Deferred beyond 2008,” The New York Times, New York, May 
16, 1997, Secton B, Page 16, in Moss, 4.
61 Mark Hyman, “The Olympics: A Man, A Plan, New York,” Bloomberg Businessweek, New York, November 
3, 2002, accessed March 3, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2002-11-03/the-olympics-a-man-a-plan-
new-york; NYC2012, The Olympic Games in the World’s Second Home: Candidature File, New York: 2004, vol.1 
p 31.
62 Moss, 4.
Figure 4: New York City 2012 Candidate City Logo (NYC2012)
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and government officials worked closely to create planned rezonings to match Olympic target 
neighborhoods, and speed infrastructure projects through the exhaustive Uniform Land Use 
Review Procedure (ULURP).  This, of course, is somewhat easier to do when the former head of 
the bid organization now sits as an appointed Deputy Mayor with influence over the City Planning 
Department and Commission.  Professor Mitchell Moss of New York University marveled at 
the bid’s ability to turn a Gordian knot of neighborhoods, projects, and procedures, into one 
document: “The NYC2012 Olympic Bid packaged all of these separate projects and proposals 
and others, across all five boroughs, into one comprehensive development plan that would be 
implemented according to the strict timetable of the Olympic bid process.”63   The Olympic venue 
map for NYC2012 is shown below in Figure 5. 
 Many of the projects and proposals mentioned in the NYC2012 bid had been proposed 
prior to discussions of Olympic master planning, but little progress had been made to bring 
them to fruition.  Of particular note is the original plan for the Olympic Stadium, which was sited 
on the Western Rail Yards of the LIRR in Manhattan, serving Penn Station.  Governor Mario 
Cuomo had talked with the Yankees baseball team as early as 1993 about the possibility of 
creating a stadium on the Far West Side.64   Director of Sustainability Planning for New York 
City’s Department of City Planning, Samuel Hornick, noted that the city had been working on the 
immensely complex rezoning of Hudson Yards, including the Western Rail Yards, since the early 
1990s.65  
 As NYC2012 explored the bid in earnest, the Western Rail Yard site presented itself as 
an opportunity for a new football stadium doing double-duty as an Olympic Stadium.66    The 
Department of City Planning created a rezoning proposal to enable a stadium use on the site and 
complementary zoning controls in the neighborhood, which was approved by the City Council in 
2005.67   Hornick drew attention to the confluence of the bid and the city’s rezoning desires, and 
63 Moss, 12.
64 Douglas Feiden, Alan Mirabella and Marcia Parker, “Bronx Cheer greets Cuomo’s stadium,” Crain’s New York 
Business, July 5, 1993; Richard Sandomir, “Baseball; Stadium Drama: Parking vs. Charm,” The New York Times, 
August 15, 1993.
65 Samuel Hornick, interview, March 22, 2013.
66 American Football, as opposed to international Football, commonly called soccer in the United States of 
America.
67 Sam Lubell, “New York City approves Hudson Yards zoning,” Architectural Record 193 no. 3 (March 2005): 
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credited the bid with forcing decision-making by the city on that and other rezoning options.68   
 
 By investing heavily in the services that the City and State could provide the bid without 
major price tags, NYC2012 ensured that projects and priority areas would have cleared major 
24.
68 Hornick, 2013.
Figure 5: New York City Venue and Transportation Map (NYC2012)
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zoning and regulatory hurdles by the IOC decision day.  Thus, projects could be shovel-ready 
without having to wait for zoning changes or individual public approvals.  The Olympic Stadium 
hit a snag when New York State officials rejected the stadium plan.69   As NYC2012 and the City 
of New York went scrambling for an alternative, the Hudson Yards rezoning remained in place. 
That rezoning led the way for the 2012 groundbreaking ceremony for the massive Related 
Companies’ mixed-use commercial and residential development at Hudson Yards, slated to add 
more than 13 million square feet of space to Manhattan’s urban fabric.
 This strategy of pre-planning and committing to follow-through has helped to transform the 
city of New York in the eight years since the bid was rejected by the IOC: the #7 line extension is 
under construction; East River Ferries are operating; Hunters Point South mixed-use residential 
development is under construction in Long Island City; new Yankees, Mets, and Barclays 
sports arenas have been built; the Brooklyn waterfront in Greenpoint and Williamsburg is being 
developed into parkland.  Critics and celebrators alike today recognize the transformative power 
of the NYC2012 bid.
 The projects outlined in the NYC2012 bid are shown in Table 4.  The table shows 
whether the project sites or venues existed at the time of the bid, and what their status is at 
the 2013 analysis year.  Sites or venues were found to have been constructed or implemented, 
experienced no action, or experienced modified action.  At the 2013 analysis year, four projects 
were constructed, under construction, or had been implemented as planned for the 2012 Olympic 
Games.  Seven projects were under construction or had been constructed in a manner that was 
modified from the 2012 Olympic Games plan.  Twelve projects had experienced no construction 
or action since the NYC2012 bid.  
 Although it is impossible to draw a direct line of causation between the bid and development 
or infrastructure projects in New York City, the correlation is strong, and consensus has been 
building that the bid has created a strong positive legacy for the city.  Sport-specific venues, for 
the most part, were not constructed at all, or were realized as modified construction projects. 
For example, the Astoria Pool in Queens was not renovated to serve as an Olympic-caliber 
69 Sam Lubell, “Olympic switch: New York Rejects Manhattan stadium, proposes another in Queens” Architec-































































































stadium-style pool.  However, it has seen construction activity, and its diving well is being 
transformed into an entertainment venue to serve the borough of Queens.70   Samuel Hornick, 
the sustainability planner for New York City, noted that in the case of New York’s bid, the city’s 
interests in rezonings and land use changes were well-aligned with those of NYC2012.  He 
believes that New York’s bid gave it the best of both worlds: the prestige of bidding, the positive 
effects of a well-crafted bid legacy plan, and the freedom to pursue development not shackled to 
the specific needs of the Olympic sports requirements.
 The NYC2012 bid acted as a policy window, bringing problem and policy streams together 
through the work of a policy entrepreneur, Daniel Doctoroff.  With the impetus of the Olympic 
bid, the city of New York was able to fast-track rezonings, public infrastructure spending and 
provision, and stadia projects.  It is possible that these projects could have happened without 
the bid, but it is unlikely.  New York’s Olympic Bid experience provides a useful example of how 
public and private sectors can work together to exploit the bid process to create lasting positive 
effects for the city.
C.  Chicago 2016
 
 The Chicago bid suffered from not being as fully integrated with city government the way 
that the Toronto and New York bids were.  Chicago 2016 was led by corporate insurance broker 
Patrick Ryan, who achieved prominence in the Chicago business community by founding and 
leading the Aon Corporation, a business insurance brokerage.71   (See Figure 6).  Although the 
bid had strong support from long-term Mayor Richard M. Daley, it did not have the benefit of 
coordinated political will to spur it to long-term planning in the bid stages.  
 The Chicago bid for the 2016 Games brought a modern chapter to Chicago’s storied history 
as a host for previous World’s Columbian Expositions, in 1893 and 1933.  To host the Games, 
Chicago 2016 prepared a bid consisting of existing sports facilities, temporary sports facilities, 
and needed sports facility construction, as well as a massive Olympic Village development on 
70 Maria Fitzsimmons, “Astoria dives into entertainment,” Queens Chronicle, February 28, 2013: 1.
71 John Peltz, “Ryan’s Hope.”  Crain’s Chicago Business, 32 no. 5 (February 2, 2009): 1.
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Figure 6: Chicago 2016 Candidate City Logo (Chicago 2016)
the Lake Michigan waterfront.  Although the bid generally shied away from making long-term 
commitments about specific projects, the Olympic Village site and sister legacy organization 
World Sport Chicago received special treatment.  The official Candidature File states that 
“regardless of bid outcome,” the proposed site of the Olympic Village would be developed into a 
new residential community.72  
 Chicago 2016 chose the site of the failed Michael Reese Hospital for the Olympic Village 
development.  The City of Chicago purchased the former hospital campus after it ceased 
operations.  Previously, the Olympic Village had been sited on the surface parking lots south of 
the McCormick Place convention center.  Moving the Olympic Village to the Michael Reese site 
provided the opportunity for not just housing development but also Lake Michigan waterfront 
park development.73   However, after the IOC chose Rio de Janeiro over Chicago in 2009, the 
impetus for action disappeared.  
 The city has as of yet failed to make an agreement with any developer to undertake 
the Olympic Village concept, although it hopes to sell the 37-acre now-vacant site to one or 
more developers. Current Mayor Rahm Emanuel, following in former Mayor Richard M. Daley’s 
72 Chicago 2016, Candidate City, Volume 1, Chicago: Chicago 2016, 2009: 20.
73 John Peltz, “Grabbing for Gold, Crain’s Chicago Business 31, no. 33 (August 18, 2008): 2.
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footsteps, hopes that the site will be developed in the near future.74   Mayor Emanuel has awarded 
a contract to prominent architecture firm Skidmore, Owings & Merrill design new site plans for 
non-housing uses for the Michael Reese site.  The contract gives SOM responsibility for property 
redevelopment, strategic planning and consulting services, and is linked to Mayor Richard M. 
Daley’s back-up plan to turn the site into a technology business park.75   Currently, plans for 
the Michael Reese site at present remain nebulous, and it is unsure whether the housing that 
would have resulted from a Chicago-held Games in 2016 will ever stand on the former hospital 
grounds.
 None of the many sport-specific projects that the Chicago bid proposed have been 
constructed, and many of the sites they were proposed on have not been altered as a result 
of the bid.  Table 5 lists the planned development and infrastructure projects outlined in the 
Chicago 2016 bid.  The following outcomes have been identified at the 2013 analysis year: 
Action or no action on a pre-existing project or venue, and construction, modified construction or 
no construction on a planned project.   
 The Chicago 2016 bid, unlike NYC2012, did not create plans for public infrastructure 
projects.  Its scope was limited to 15 project sites for sports stadia, venues, and facilities.  At 
the 2013 analysis year, five pre-existing venues were unchanged from their pre-bid status; no 
action had been performed on them to enact the bid plans.  Nine planned project sites had not 
been constructed.  One pre-existing project site, Northerly Island, has construction.  However, 
the project is remarkably different from the Chicago 2016 bid plans.
 Northerly Island was the planned site for Olympic sailing, rowing, kayak, canoeing, open-
water swimming and beach volleyball.  The island, shown in figure 7, juts out from the South Loop 
of Chicago into Lake Michigan, where it shelters the Daniel Burnham Marina.  It is owned by the 
Chicago Parks Department (CPD), and was created to house exhibitions for the 1934 Chicago 
World’s Fair.  The island formerly housed Miegs Field, a small airport used mainly by charter 
flights.  Miegs Field operated until the early 2000s, when security concerns led to its demise. 
74 Hal Dardick, “City refinances $91M loan on Michael Reese site,” Chicago Tribune, April 18, 2012, 2.
75 Fran Spielman and David Roeder, “Mayor moving to redevelop Michael Reese site,” Chicago Sun-Times, 















































































































When Mayor Richard M. Daley ordered the demolition of the runways in 2004, Northerly Island 
became a potential site for major redevelopment.  
 Chicago 2016 plans for the redevelopment of Northerly Island, created between 2005 
and 2009, were not well-coordinated with those of the City of Chicago or CPD, according to Bob 
Foster, a CPD Senior Project Manager. “It was like a political wind that came in, and when it 
blew out, CPD was able to reconsider this site’s opportunities for Chicagoans in the long run.”76 
Now freed from the specific development requirements of the Olympic Games, Northerly Island 
is planned to be remade as a center-city haven for naturalism, urban camping, and waterfront 
exploration.  Chicago 2016 had proposed to locate Olympic venues in other CPD properties, for 
example Jackson Park, Washington Park, and Lincoln Park.  With the demise of the Chicago 
2016 Olympic bid, the CPD no longer has to plan for the accommodation of sport-specific venues 
on those properties, and has chosen not to provide them in its current capital plans. 
 Although Chicago bears little physical evidence of its bid for the 2016 Olympics, the bid 
did create an innovative plan for Olympic legacy in the city regardless of the bid’s performance. 
The commitment made to the legacy organization World Sport Chicago, a youth sports nonprofit, 
was promised and is being delivered. Chicago 2016 claimed that World Sport Chicago would 
exist even if the city did not receive the bid for the 2016 Games.  Not long before the bid decision 
in 2009, Patrick Ryan affirmed that the organization embodied “important and long-lasting 
benefits for Chicago and its people” that Chicago 2016 would produce with or without winning 
the Games.77   Paired with the disbursement of privately-raised funds gathered by Chicago 2016 
to neighborhood foundations, World Sport Chicago is active as a legacy of the Chicago bid.
 With so little evidence at hand, it may be too early to determine whether or not the Chicago 
2016 bid functioned as a policy window.  The data available, however, show that there was little 
coordination between bid organization and the City, and that the bid was limited in scope to 
sports-related infrastructure.  There is no policy entrepreneur for the Chicago 2016 bid, and little 
lasting evidence that the bid occurred.  Chicago 2016 can be a cautionary tale for cities: when 
76 Bob Foster, interview, April 16, 2013.
77 Patrick Ryan, “Leaving a Lasting Legacy,” The Huffington Post, July 28, 2009, accessed April 10, 2013.  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/patrick-ryan/leaving-a-lasting-legacy_b_245545.html.
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the bid is uncoordinated and poorly linked to city priorities, it cannot function as a policy window 
to create lasting effects for the city or its citizens.




 Policy entrepreneurs are those individuals who combine the problem stream with the 
policy stream and the politics stream: they connect pre-existing alternatives with timely actions. 
We can certainly characterize David Crombie from Toronto’s BIDCO as a policy entrepreneur, 
who saw the bid for Toronto 2008 as an opportunity to tackle the Port Lands redevelopment that 
Toronto badly needed.  His work supplanted the decades-long work of the Toronto City Planning 
Department and the Toronto Harbor Commission to bring waterfront redevelopment to the action 
stage.  Likewise, Daniel Doctoroff of NYC2012 and the New York City Mayor’s Office is also a 
policy entrepreneur.  Whereas the New York City Planning Department had identified priority 
areas for rezonings and redevelopment, Doctoroff’s vision and mettle paired that idea with an 
active solution in the Olympics bid.  For both Toronto and New York, bid cities where the bid was 
bolstered by strong city government support and beneficiaries of particularly close relationships 
between the bid organization and organizations or agencies of the city, the paths from idea to 
action were ameliorated.  
 In Chicago, by contrast, although the bid organization made inroads into providing some 
nonprofit support to neighborhoods and sports development, it was unable to capitalize on 
existing, identified city needs and opportunities, and did not coordinate its work as a private entity 
with the existing city agencies and departments.   We cannot identify any policy entrepreneurs 
in the Chicago 2016 bid.  Although it is too early to quantify the long-term effects of the Chicago 
bid, the fact remains that the bid itself did not seize the opportunity to pair the transformative 
potential of the bid process with contemporary Chicago urban planning problems.
 The case studies suggest that Olympic bids can and do act as policy windows, provided 
that coordination between the bid organization and city government is strong.  Toronto and New 
York showcase the positive effects that can occur when a bid is aligned with city interests, and 
city government can exploit the political and development pressures created by the bid.  Chicago 
shows that a mediocre bid creates mediocre lasting effects.
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VII.  CONCLUSION + RECOMMENDATIONS
 While planners and others in positions of social, political, and economic criticism have 
built a robust body of work with about the positive and negative outcomes of Olympic Host Cities, 
similar investigations of Olympic Bid Cities are just now emerging.  Gary Hustwit and Jon Pack’s 
book of photojournalism on decaying former arenas, The Olympic City, is due to be published at 
the end of May 2013.   Their work represents a revolution of events for Olympic Host Cities in 
the public eye: publically celebrated; then criticized by academics, and now publicly criticized.  
There are signs that this work may not be alone in considering Olympic Bid Cities’ legacies.  A 
panel at the 2013 American Planning Conference brought representatives from the recent 2008 
Games in Beijing, the failed bid for Chicago 2016, and the forthcoming 2016 Games in Rio 
de Janiero, Brazil.  The panel, attended by an audience of planning professionals, sparked a 
post on The Atlantic Cities, a national blog covering planning and urbanism.  The author, Emily 
Badger, focused on the presentation from Chicago, asking the question, “What happens to the 
Olympic plans of cities that don’t win?”  
 Although the expense of mounting a bid for the Olympic Games is significant, and likely 
growing, the experiences of Toronto, New York and Chicago inform us that the bid process 
can benefit a city whether or not that city hosts the Games it has bid to do.  Contemporary 
scholarship has focused on the mixed legacies of Host Cities: whether their investments in 
venues, transportation, and the bid process have resulted in positive or negative effects.  I make 
the case that recent unsuccessful bids show how the bid process can be leveraged to make the 
bid serve the city, rather than the other way around.  
 Since the bid process is a multi-year, multi-million dollar process on its own – Chicago 
2016 reports having over $48M in expenditures for just under 3 years of operation  – cities have 
significant motivation to reap real benefits for their investment, regardless of how much of the 
funding is from public or private sources.  I propose three recommendations in order to maximize 
the potential benefits from the bid process for cities:
1. The United States Olympic Committee and the Canadian Olympic Association should 
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mandate that all future bid organizations will be public-private partnerships.  Currently, 
bid organizations are private, non-profit organizations that are not required to connect 
with the public sector.  Requiring the participation of city agencies or departments such 
as Economic Development, City Planning, Housing and Preservation, or Design and 
Construction in the bid leads to a greater likelihood that policy window opportunities 
for city priorities can be recognized and exploited.  New York City’s close partnership 
between City agencies and NYC2012, the bid organization, allowed for an Olympic-bid 
focus on public infrastructure investments as well as private investments for venues and 
stadia.  While an unsuccessful bid city may not be interested in building a vélodrome or 
an equestrian arena, public infrastructure needs are always present.  NYC2012 was able 
to throw support behind two major public infratstructure projects: the extension of the #7 
line in Manhattan, and East River Ferry service linking Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens. 
2. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) should amend the Olympic Charter to require 
cities to include a detailed legacy plan with as a part of an Olympic Bid.   This plan should 
lay out future strategies for proposed development areas, venues, and social investments 
for two possibilities: hosting the Olympics, and not hosting the Olympics.  Mandating this 
exercise requires bid organizations to be explicit about the legacy that the Games can 
provide.  
I am inspired by the creation of the London Legacy Development Corporation as a part 
of the London 2012 Games.  The London bid for the 2012 Games did not include a 
comprehensive legacy plan.  However, the London Organising Committee of the Olympic 
and Paralympic Games (LOCOG) worked towards hosting the Games in 2012, concerns 
about the long-term future of Games-related investments and developments pointed to 
a need for a development corporation.  The Olympic Park Legacy Company came into 
being in 2009 to “make sure that all the money sunk into [the Games] doesn’t go to 
waste,” in the words of a British blogger.   The Company, now known as the London 
Legacy Development Corporation, has the responsibility to determine future uses for the 
land, venues, and investments made as a part of the 2012 Olympics.
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Although the Chicago bid included a separate legacy organization, I do not believe that 
a sport-focused legacy is appropriate for the scale of development and investment that 
accompanies an Olympic Games.  By melding the timeline of the Chicago organization’s 
in-bid inclusion and the London organization’s sweeping scope, legacy plans and their 
associated organizations stand a chance to institutionalize the potential of the policy 
window opening.
1. The IOC should amend the Olympic Charter to require that comprehensive legacy plans 
are accompanied by the creation of a nonprofit legacy organization.  The mission of this 
organization will be to enact the legacy plan that is triggered by the IOC’s decision to 
award or not award the city the bid for the Games. 
 In effect, I am arguing for bids that are more poised for success at the international 
competition level because they are constructed for success in the possibility of their failure. 
Cities can treat the Olympic Bid process as both a goal to be achieved on its own merits and 
as a means to achieve general city-development goals.  Needs for bid cities will differ based 
on the particular circumstances of each city’s location, population, and budgetary constraints. 
Nonetheless, the path has been proven: Olympic bids do function as policy windows, and should 




Candidate City: A city that has submitted a bid to the IOC at the international competition level 
of bidding to host the Games.  For the purposes of this thesis, Candidate City is a term used to 
refer primarily to those cities whose bids were unsuccessful.
Candidature File: The official application document to the International Olympic Committee 
that constitutes a city’s bid materials for a bid to host a future Games.  This document must 
contain information and plans for venues, housing, media facilities, environmental and historic 
considerations, accommodations, transportation, medical services, anti-doping controls, security 
concerns, technological systems, energy resources, legal aspects, customs and immigration 
formalities, and finance and marketing.
Host City: A city that has been chosen as the winner to host the Olympic Games. Host cities of 
the recent past include Sydney (2000), Athens (2004), Beijing (2008) and London (2012).
Olympic Bid: A formal application put forth by an applicant city’s Olympic Bid group to the 
International Olympic Committee to host a future Games.
International Olympic Committee (IOC): The official governing body of the Olympic Games, 
responsible for conducting the international-level host city bid process.
United States Olympic Committee (USOC): The official governing body for the United States, a 
subsidiary of the International Olympic Committee, and the official sponsor of the bids made by 
United States cities to the IOC.  The USOC selects which American city will continue to bid at 
the international level.
B.  Interview Format
Interview subjects responded to the following IRB-approved questions to constitute the interview:
1. How would you characterize the types of development projects that happened in this city 
prior to the Olympic bid?
2. How would you characterize development pressures or ideologies that existed in this city 
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prior to its Olympic Bid?
3. Do you believe there were changes in development projects and development pressures 
or ideologies in this city due to the Olympic Bid?
4. What changes in urban planning policies or notable development projects have you 
witnessed since the bid became public?
5. Speak about any potential differences you noticed in policies or projects that became 
public in the initial aftermath of the bid announcement and those that occurred more 
recently – both proposed and implemented.
6. Do you believe that any of those projects or policy changes were directly tied to the bid 
submission?
7. Do you believe that any of those projects or policy changes were part of the city’s overall 
project and policy discussion prior to the bid formation period?
8. Which of those projects or policy changes were eventually implemented or built?
9. What institutional or city actors do you believe were instrumental in promoting or sponsoring 
successfully built projects?
10. Are there any projects or policies that you believe were enacted largely as part of the 
opportunities created by the Olympic bid?
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